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We show that restricted monotonicity, with an auxiliary condition called
individual maximality, is necessary and sufficient for secure implementa-
tion. This result gives us an alternative characterization of securely imple-
mentable social choice functions in terms of restricted monotonicity. We
then discuss the importance of secure implementation in complete infor-
mation environments in terms of Schelling (1960)’s focal point.
Keywords: Secure Implementation, Restricted Monotonicity, Individual
Maximality, A Focal Point.
JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D71.
2
1 Introduction
Secure implementation, a concept that was developed by Saijo et al. (2007),
is double implementation in Nash equilibria and dominant strategy equilib-
ria. Saijo et al. (2007) showed that necessary and sufficient conditions for se-
cure implementation are strategy-proofness and the rectangular property. In
this paper, we provide alternative characterizations of securely implementable
social choice functions.1 In Theorem 1, we show that restricted monotonicity,
a stronger version of monotonicity, and individual maximality form necessary
and sufficient conditions for secure implementation. Moreover, in Corollary 2,
we show that in some environments, restricted monotonicity alone, without in-
dividual maximality, is necessary and sufficient for secure implementation.
In the presence of restricted monotonicity, individual maximality is equiva-
lent to strategy-proofness (although, in general, it is weaker than strategy-proofness).
This fact, taken together with Theorem 1, leads to Corollary 1: Restricted mono-
tonicity and strategy-proofness are necessary and sufficient conditions for se-
cure implementation. This alternative characterization clarifies the fact that
secure implementation is double implementation in Nash equilibria and dom-
inant strategy equilibria. With regard to this description, we see that charac-
terizations based on restricted monotonicity capture quite well the structure of
secure implementation.
We also show in Corollary 3 a constancy result of secure implementation,
which follows immediately from Corollary 2 and the result of Saijo (1987): In
some environments, a social choice function satisfying dual dominance (Saijo
(1987)) is securely implementable if and only if it is a constant function. In
the literature, some other constancy results regarding secure implementation
have been obtained. Bochet and Sakai (2007) reported the constancy result,
which says that only the equal division function is symmetric and securely im-
plementable in allotment economies with single-peaked preferences. Fujinaka
and Wakayama (2008a) established that in economies with indivisible objects
and money, only constant social choice functions are securely implementable
under a domain-richness condition. Moreover, Fujinaka and Wakayama (2008b)
showed the constancy result that the no-trade solution is the unique securely
implementable social choice function that satisfies individual rationality in Shapley-
Scarf housing markets.
Indeed, these results have negative implications for the existence of a non-
trivial, securely implementable social choice function. If a non-trivial, securely
implementable social choice function is found, however, then the secure mech-
anism, which securely implements the social choice function, is more likely to
perform well in practice. In fact, in the experimental results of Cason et al.
(2006), who compared the performances of a secure and a non-secure mecha-
1Mizukami and Wakayama (2005) also alternatively characterized securely implementable so-
cial choice functions in pure exchange economies in terms of a stronger version of non-bossiness.
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nism, the secure mechanism performed better than the non-secure mechanism.
Moreover, in complete information environments, the secure mechanism would
have the advantage of preventing the miscoordination of agents in the light of
Schelling (1960)’s focal point, which we discuss in greater detail in Section 4.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives notation and definitions.
We characterize securely implementable social choice functions in terms of re-
stricted monotonicity in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the significance
of secure implementation in complete information environments in terms of
Schelling (1960)’s focal point. Section 5 presents our conclusions.
2 Notation and Definitions
Let N := {1,2, . . . ,n} be the set of agents, where 2 ≤ n < +∞. Let A be the set of
feasible outcomes.
Each agent i ∈ N has preferences over A, which are represented by a com-
plete and transitive binary relation Ri . The strict preference and indifference
relations associated with Ri are denoted by Pi and Ii , respectively. Let Ri de-
note the set of possible preferences for agent i ∈ N . The domain is denoted by
R := R1×R2×·· · ×Rn . A preference profile is a list R = (R1,R2, . . . ,Rn) ∈ R. It
is assumed that each agent can observe not only her own preferences but also
those of all other agents.
An environment is a collection (N , A,R).
Let LCi (a;Ri ) := {b ∈ A | a Ri b } be agent i ’s lower contour set of a ∈ A at Ri ∈
Ri . For each i ∈ N , let MEi (Ā;Ri ) :=
{
a ∈ Ā ∣∣ a Ri b for all b ∈ Ā } be the set of
maximal elements in Ā ⊆ A at Ri ∈Ri .2
A social choice function is a single-valued function f : R → A that assigns a
feasible outcome a ∈ A to each preference profile R ∈ R. Given a social choice
function f , let Oi (R) :=
{
a ∈ A ∣∣ a = f (R ′i ,R−i ) for some R ′i ∈Ri } be agent i ’s op-
tion set at R ∈ R. Note that Oi (R) = Oi (R ′i ,R−i ) for all R ∈ R, all i ∈ N , and all
R ′i ∈Ri .
Let Mi denote agent i ’s message space. A message of agent i ∈ N is mi ∈
Mi . Let M := M1 × M2 × ·· · × Mn be the message space. A mechanism is a pair
Γ = (M , g ), where g : M → A is an outcome function. A mechanism (M , g ) is
called a direct revelation mechanism if Mi = Ri for all i ∈ N .3 Given a social
choice function f , a mechanism (M , g ) is called the associated direct revelation
mechanism if Mi = Ri for all i ∈ N and g = f . A message profile is denoted by
m = (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) ∈ M .
2Note that MEi (Ā;Ri ) may be empty.
3In standard fashion, a direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism where each agent reveals
all that she knows. Hence, in complete information environments, the direct revelation mecha-
nism corresponds to a mechanism in which each agent announces the preference profile. Fol-
lowing the terminology of Saijo et al. (2007), however, we call a direct revelation mechanism a
mechanism where each agent reports only her own preferences.
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A message profile m∗ = (m∗1 ,m∗2 , . . . ,m∗n) ∈ M is a Nash equilibrium of a
mechanism (M , g ) at R ∈R if, for all i ∈ N , g (m∗i ,m∗−i ) Ri g (m′i ,m∗−i ) for all m′i ∈
Mi . Let NEΓ(R) ⊆ M denote the set of Nash equilibria of a mechanism Γ= (M , g )
at R ∈ R. A message profile m∗ = (m∗1 ,m∗2 , . . . ,m∗n) ∈ M is a dominant strat-
egy equilibrium of a mechanism (M , g ) at R ∈ R if, for all i ∈ N , g (m∗i ,m′−i ) Ri
g (m′i ,m
′
−i ) for all m
′
i ∈ Mi and all m′−i ∈ M−i . Let DSEΓ(R) ⊆ M be the set of
dominant strategy equilibria of a mechanism Γ= (M , g ) at R ∈R.
Let E -equilibrium be a game theoretic equilibrium concept. Let g (E Γ(R)) :={
a ∈ A ∣∣ a = g (m) for some m ∈ E Γ(R)} denote the set of E -equilibrium outcomes
of a mechanism Γ = (M , g ) at R ∈ R, where E Γ(R) ⊆ M denotes the set of E -
equilibria of the mechanism at R. A direct revelation mechanism Γ = (R, g )
truthfully implements a social choice function f in E -equilibria if R ∈ E Γ(R) and
g (R) = f (R) for any R ∈ R.4 A mechanism Γ = (M , g ) securely implements a so-
cial choice function f if g (NEΓ(R)) = g (DSEΓ(R)) = f (R) for any R ∈R.5 A social
choice function is securely implementable if there exists a mechanism that se-
curely implements it.
Next, we introduce some properties of social choice functions. Restricted
monotonicity is a version of monotonicity6 (Maskin (1999)) that requires the fol-
lowing. Suppose there is a change from R ∈ R to R ′ ∈ R. Then, for each agent
i ∈ N , if any outcome that was weakly worse for her than f (R) in her option set at
R when her preferences were Ri remains weakly worse for her than f (R) when
her preferences are R ′i , then f (R) must still be f -optimal at R
′.
Definition 1 (Restricted Monotonicity). A social choice function f satisfies re-
stricted monotonicity if, for all R,R ′ ∈ R, if LCi ( f (R);Ri )∩Oi (R) ⊆ LCi ( f (R);R ′i )
for all i ∈ N , then f (R ′) = f (R).
Remark 1. Restricted monotonicity is stronger than monotonicity, by defini-
tion.
Definition 2 (Individual Maximality). A social choice function f satisfies indi-
vidual maximality if, for all R ∈R, MEi (Oi (R);Ri ) 6= ; for all i ∈ N .
Remark 2. Individual maximality is weaker than strategy-proofness, by defini-
tion.
Definition 3 (Strategy-Proofness). A social choice function f satisfies strategy-
proofness if f (R) ∈ MEi (Oi (R);Ri ) for all R ∈R and all i ∈ N .
Remark 3. Consider the associated direct revelation mechanism Γ = (R, f ) for
a given social choice function f . Then, f satisfies strategy-proofness if and only
if R ∈ DSEΓ(R) for all R ∈R.
4Since we are focusing on social choice functions, truthful E -implementation can be defined
as R ∈ E Γ(R) and g (R) = f (R) for any R ∈R, instead of as R ∈ E Γ(R) and g (R) ∈ f (R) for any R ∈R.





6A social choice function f satisfies monotonicity if, for all R,R ′ ∈ R, if LCi ( f (R);Ri ) ⊆
LCi ( f (R);R
′
i ) for all i ∈ N , then f (R ′) = f (R).
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3 Characterizations
This section provides alternative characterizations of securely implementable
social choice functions in terms of restricted monotonicity. Theorem 1 below
establishes that restricted monotonicity and an auxiliary condition, individual
maximality, together form necessary and sufficient conditions for secure imple-
mentation. It should be noted that Theorem 1 holds even when n = 2.
Theorem 1. A social choice function f is securely implementable if and only if it
satisfies restricted monotonicity and individual maximality.
Proposition 1 (Dasgupta et al. (1979)) is used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Proposition 1 (Dasgupta et al. (1979)). A social choice function is truthfully im-
plemented in Nash equilibria by a direct revelation mechanism if and only if it is
truthfully implemented in dominant strategy equilibria by the same direct reve-
lation mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 1. LetΓ= (R, f ) denote the associated direct revelation mech-
anism.
The if part. Step 1: f satisfies strategy-proofness.
Suppose to the contrary that f (R) 6∈ MEi (Oi (R);Ri ) for some R ∈R and some i ∈
N . Let b ∈ A be such that b ∈ MEi (Oi (R);Ri ).7 Then, b 6= f (R). Since b ∈ Oi (R),
b = f (R̄i ,R−i ) for some R̄i ∈Ri .
Since f (R̄i ,R−i ) = b ∈ MEi (Oi (R);Ri ), we have LCi ( f (R̄i ,R−i );Ri )∩Oi (R) =
Oi (R). Since LCi ( f (R̄i ,R−i ); R̄i )∩Oi (R) ⊆Oi (R) and LCi ( f (R̄i ,R−i );Ri )∩Oi (R) =
Oi (R), we obtain LCi ( f (R̄i ,R−i ); R̄i )∩Oi (R) ⊆Oi (R) = LCi ( f (R̄i ,R−i );Ri )∩Oi (R).
Hence, it follows from Oi (R) =Oi (R̄i ,R−i ) that LCi ( f (R̄i ,R−i ); R̄i )∩Oi (R̄i ,R−i ) ⊆
LCi ( f (R̄i ,R−i );Ri )∩Oi (R̄i ,R−i ). Thus, we have LCi ( f (R̄i ,R−i ); R̄i )∩Oi (R̄i ,R−i ) ⊆
LCi ( f (R̄i ,R−i );Ri )∩Oi (R̄i ,R−i ) ⊆ LCi ( f (R̄i ,R−i );Ri ). So, since LC j ( f (R̄i ,R−i );R j )∩
O j (R̄i ,R−i ) ⊆ LC j ( f (R̄i ,R−i );R j ) for all j 6= i , restricted monotonicity implies
f (R) = f (R̄i ,R−i ), which contradicts f (R) 6= b = f (R̄i ,R−i ).
Step 2: R ∈ NEΓ(R) and f (NEΓ(R)) = f (R) for all R ∈R.
Pick any R ∈ R. Since f satisfies strategy-proofness by Step 1, it follows from
Remark 3 that R ∈ DSEΓ(R). So, R ∈ NEΓ(R).
Suppose R̄ ∈ NEΓ(R). Then, for any i ∈ N , f (R̄) Ri f (R ′i , R̄−i ) for any R ′i ∈Ri .
This implies f (R̄) ∈ MEi (Oi (R̄);Ri ) for all i ∈ N , implying LCi ( f (R̄);Ri )∩Oi (R̄) =
Oi (R̄) for all i ∈ N . Since LCi ( f (R̄); R̄i )∩Oi (R̄) ⊆Oi (R̄) and LCi ( f (R̄);Ri )∩Oi (R̄) =
Oi (R̄) for all i ∈ N , we have LCi ( f (R̄); R̄i )∩Oi (R̄) ⊆Oi (R̄) = LCi ( f (R̄);Ri )∩Oi (R̄)
for all i ∈ N . This implies LCi ( f (R̄); R̄i )∩Oi (R̄) ⊆ LCi ( f (R̄);Ri )∩Oi (R̄) ⊆ LCi ( f (R̄);Ri )
for all i ∈ N . Therefore, restricted monotonicity implies f (R) = f (R̄). So, f (R) =
f (R̄) for any R̄ ∈ NEΓ(R). This implies f (NEΓ(R)) = f (R). Thus, f (NEΓ(R)) =
f (R) for all R ∈R.
7It should be noted that MEi (Oi (R);Ri ) 6= ; by individual maximality.
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Step 3: f is securely implementable.
By Step 2, R ∈ NEΓ(R) and f (NEΓ(R)) = f (R) for all R ∈ R. This implies that
f is truthfully Nash implemented by Γ. So, by Proposition 1, f is truthfully
dominant strategy implemented by Γ: R ∈ DSEΓ(R) for all R ∈ R. This implies
R ∈ DSEΓ(R) ⊆ NEΓ(R) for all R ∈ R. Hence, f (R) ∈ f (DSEΓ(R)) ⊆ f (NEΓ(R))
for all R ∈ R. Thus, f (DSEΓ(R)) = f (NEΓ(R)) = f (R) for all R ∈ R, because
f (NEΓ(R)) = f (R) for all R ∈R.
The only if part. Since f is securely implementable, it is also dominant strat-
egy implementable. So, f satisfies strategy-proofness by the revelation principle
for dominant strategy implementation. Hence, it follows from Remark 2 that f
satisfies individual maximality. In the remainder of the proof of the only if part,
we show that f satisfies restricted monotonicity.
Step 1: R ∈ NEΓ(R) and f (NEΓ(R)) = f (R) for all R ∈R.
Since f is securely implementable, the revelation principle for secure imple-
mentation (Saijo et al. (2007)) implies that it is securely implemented by Γ. So,
f (NEΓ(R)) = f (DSEΓ(R)) = f (R) for all R ∈ R. Moreover, the revelation prin-
ciple for dominant strategy implementation implies that f satisfies strategy-
proofness. So, it follows from Remark 3 that R ∈ DSEΓ(R) for all R ∈ R, which
implies R ∈ DSEΓ(R) ⊆ NEΓ(R) for all R ∈R.
Step 2: f satisfies restricted monotonicity.
Pick any R, R̄ ∈ R such that LCi ( f (R);Ri )∩Oi (R) ⊆ LCi ( f (R); R̄i ) for all i ∈ N .
Then, R ∈ NEΓ(R) by Step 1. Since R ∈ NEΓ(R), it follows that for all i ∈ N , f (R) Ri
f (R ′i ,R−i ) for all R
′
i ∈ Ri . This implies f (R) ∈ MEi (Oi (R);Ri ) for all i ∈ N . So,
LCi ( f (R);Ri )∩Oi (R) =Oi (R) for all i ∈ N .
Since LCi ( f (R);Ri )∩Oi (R) =Oi (R) and LCi ( f (R);Ri )∩Oi (R) ⊆ LCi ( f (R); R̄i )
for all i ∈ N , we have Oi (R) ⊆ LCi ( f (R); R̄i ) for all i ∈ N . So, for all i ∈ N , f (R) R̄i
f (R ′i ,R−i ) for all R
′
i ∈Ri , implying R ∈ NEΓ(R̄). Hence, f (R) ∈ f (NEΓ(R̄)), whereas
f (NEΓ(R̄)) = f (R̄) by Step 1. Thus, f (R) ∈ f (NEΓ(R̄)) = f (R̄). This implies f (R̄) =
f (R), because f is a single-valued function.
Remark 4. The revelation principle for secure implementation tells us that se-
cure implementation is equivalent to double implementation in Nash equilibria
and dominant strategy equilibria by the associated direct revelation mechanism.
Hence, secure implementability implicitly requires Nash implementability by
the associated direct revelation mechanism. When considering implementation
by the associated direct revelation mechanism, satisfying individual maximality
is equivalent to the mechanism possessing the best response property8 (Jackson
et al. (1994)), which would be an appropriate restriction on mechanisms in or-
der for the Nash equilibrium concept to make sense, as pointed out by Jackson
et al. (1994). Theorem 1 indicates that secure implementation by the associated
8A mechanism (M , g ) satisfies the best response property if, for all R ∈ R, all i ∈ N , and all
m−i ∈ M−i , there exists mi ∈ Mi such that g (mi ,m−i ) Ri g (m′i ,m−i ) for all m′i ∈ Mi .
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direct revelation mechanism is impossible as long as the mechanism violates
the best response property.
As shown in the proof of Theorem 1, individual maximality, together with re-
stricted monotonicity, implies strategy-proofness. It then follows from Remark
2 that individual maximality and strategy-proofness are equivalent in the pres-
ence of restricted monotonicity. Thus, Theorem 1 leads to the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 1. A social choice function is securely implementable if and only if it
satisfies restricted monotonicity and strategy-proofness.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 provide alternative characterizations of securely
implementable social choice functions. In contrast to the characterization by
Saijo et al. (2007), our characterizations have the advantage of using a version
of monotonicity, which is a well-known property in implementation theory. In
fact, Corollary 1 makes evident the fact that secure implementation is double
implementation in Nash equilibria and dominant strategy equilibria.
Furthermore, in certain environments, individual maximality is redundant
in the characterization of securely implementable social choice functions. The
following is due to Dasgupta et al. (1979).
Proposition 2 (Dasgupta et al. (1979)). Suppose that R is rich.9 Then, if a social
choice function satisfies monotonicity, it also satisfies strategy-proofness.
Proposition 2, together with Remark 1, implies that restricted monotonicity
implies strategy-proofness if R is rich. Then, by Remark 2, restricted mono-
tonicity implies individual maximality if R is rich. In addition, if A is finite, then
individual maximality is automatically satisfied by the completeness and tran-
sitivity of preferences, regardless of whether or not R is rich. Thus, we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 2. Suppose that either (i) A is finite or (ii) R is rich. Then, a social
choice function is securely implementable if and only if it satisfies restricted mono-
tonicity.
We end this section by providing a corollary which follows directly from Corol-
lary 2 and Proposition 3 (Saijo (1987)) below.
Proposition 3 (Saijo (1987)). A social choice function satisfying dual dominance10
is monotonic if and only if it is constant.
9Given a,b ∈ A, b improves with respect to a for i ∈ N as the preference profile changes from R to
R ′ if (i) a Pi b and b R ′i a or (ii) a Ri b and b P
′
i a. A domain R is rich (Maskin and Sjöström (2002))
if, for all a,b ∈ A and all R,R ′ ∈R, if, for all i ∈ N , b does not improve with respect to a for when the
preference profile changes from R to R ′, then there exists R ′′ ∈R such that LCi (a;Ri ) ⊆ LCi (a;R ′′i )
and LCi (b;R
′
i ) ⊆ LCi (b;R ′′i ) for all i ∈ N .
10A social choice function f satisfies dual dominance if, for all a, a′ ∈ f (R), there exist R,R ′,R ′′ ∈
R with f (R) = a and f (R ′) = a′ such that LCi (a;Ri ) ⊆ LCi (a;R ′′i ) and LCi (a′;R ′i ) ⊆ LCi (a′;R ′′i ) for
all i ∈ N , where f (R) :=
{
a ∈ A ∣∣ a = f (R) for some R ∈R }.
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Corollary 3. Suppose that either (i) A is finite or (ii) R is rich. Then, a social
choice function satisfying dual dominance is securely implementable if and only
if it is constant.
4 Discussions
This section provides another interpretation of secure implementation and dis-
cusses the importance of secure implementation in complete information envi-
ronments in terms of Schelling (1960)’s focal point.
The revelation principle for secure implementation says that secure imple-
mentation is equivalent to double implementation in Nash equilibria and domi-
nant strategy equilibria by the associated direct revelation mechanism. The rev-
elation principle for dominant strategy implementation tells us that truthful re-
porting by each agent is a dominant strategy equilibrium in the associated direct
revelation mechanism. Moreover, by Proposition 1 (Dasgupta et al. (1979)), if
truth-telling by each agent is a dominant strategy equilibrium of the associated
direct revelation mechanism, then it is also a Nash equilibrium of the mecha-
nism. Taken together, these lead to the following interpretation of secure imple-
mentation: Secure implementation is Nash implementation by the associated
direct revelation mechanism, where truth-telling by each agent is required to be
a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism.11
In complete information environments, the requirement that truthful reve-
lation by each agent be a Nash equilibrium of the associated direct revelation
mechanism would be appealing from a practical standpoint. Suppose that there
is an associated direct revelation mechanism that implements a social choice
function but violates the requirement, and suppose that it has multiple equi-
libria. In such a mechanism, it would be hard for agents to predict one an-
other’s actions, which could lead to miscoordination. Since, in complete in-
formation environments, each agent knows with certainty every other agent’s
true preferences, and since all Nash equilibrium outcomes are the same by full
implementability, if truthful reporting by each agent is a Nash equilibrium of
the mechanism, then the truthful Nash equilibrium would be salient and could
11Since the seminal paper by Maskin (1999), many papers have sought to fully characterize
the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences. However, the full characteriza-
tions rely on complicated mechanisms with large message spaces used in the constructive proofs.
Aside from the papers, Saijo (1988) showed that Nash implementation can be achieved by a mech-
anism with a smaller message space, by paying attention to informational decentralization and
efficiency of mechanisms (e.g., see Hurwicz (1960, 1972) and Williams (1986, 2001) for the sig-
nificance of informational decentralization and efficiency in mechanism design and implemen-
tation theory). Tatamitani (2001) subsequently focused attention on informational decentraliza-
tion and considered Nash implementation by a self-relevant mechanism. From the viewpoint of
the literature on Nash implementation, Nash implementation by the associated direct revelation
mechanism, which is the simplest informationally decentralized mechanism, with the additional
restriction that truthful reporting by each agent must be a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism is
thought of as secure implementation.
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serve as a focal point (Schelling (1960)),12 and agents would thereby be able to
coordinate their actions.
While it is true that the requirement of the existence of the truthful Nash
equilibrium in the associated direct revelation mechanism drastically narrows
the class of implementable social choice functions, it can be justified by the
salience property of such an equilibrium. In order to make practical use of a the-
oretically constructed mechanism, it is important to pay attention to the possi-
bility that agents fail to coordinate their actions, which is very likely if the mech-
anism possesses multiple equilibria, as mentioned above and demonstrated in
coordination game experiments (e.g., see Camerer (2003)). In a mechanism with
a focal point equilibrium, on the other hand, agents would be able to coordinate
their actions even if there exist multiple equilibria. Thus, in complete informa-
tion environments, secure implementation can be conceived as implementa-
tion by a mechanism designed for the purpose of preventing miscoordination.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that restricted monotonicity and individual maxi-
mality (or strategy-proofness) form both necessary and sufficient conditions for
secure implementation. We have also shown that in certain environments, re-
stricted monotonicity alone is necessary and sufficient for secure implemen-
tation. Our characterizations of secure implementation, which are based on
a stronger version of monotonicity, seem to capture quite well the structure
of secure implementation, i.e., double implementation in Nash equilibria and
dominant strategy equilibria. Moreover, we have discussed the practical appeal
of secure implementation in complete information environments in terms of
Schelling (1960)’s focal point. Since the secure mechanism has important prac-
tical advantages over non-secure ones, an important direction for further re-
search is to search for non-trivial, securely implementable social choice func-
tions in various environments.
12When considering truthful Nash implementation as opposed to secure implementation, the
truthful Nash equilibrium of the associated direct revelation mechanism could not be salient;
hence, it could not be a focal point. The reason for this is that, when secure implementation is
impossible, the mechanism often has an untruthful Nash equilibrium whose outcome is not the
same as that of the truthful Nash equilibrium. Recall that the truthful Nash equilibrium becomes
salient only because all Nash equilibrium outcomes are the same by full implementability. In
fact, the truthful Nash equilibrium would not be highlighted if the associated direct revelation
mechanism has an untruthful Nash equilibrium outcome that Pareto dominates the truthful Nash
equilibrium outcome. See also Moore and Repullo (1988) for a similar discussion.
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